Abstract
Introduction
The Adaptive Multisensor Integrated Security System (AMISS) [3] is a system designed to provide security for nuclear facilities and other facilities for which safety and security are concerns and for which normal day-to-day activities change over time. Our system is different from the usual concept of a security system which is built from systems that provide access control and intrusion alarms. Rather we hope to operate in facilities that have significant ongoing activity, within which we must identify and place an alarm for 0-78034053-1/97/$10.00 @ 1997 IEEE activities that might be ','threatening" in that facility. In many cases this threakening activity will not have been specified beforehand.
The system combines expert systems, statistical evaluations, and adaptive processes (neural and fuzzy) at almost all levels of operation. Outputs of systems of similar sensors (e.g., Passive Infra-Red Mot,ion det,ectors, or PIRs) ,are combined through a feedforward neural network [6] that has been trained to localize the motion in a room.
From this straightforward case of sensor fusion we move to the process of combining similar information from different sensors. For example, our video processing system localizes the humans in the room, and this determination is combined with the PIR net,-work to better define th.e locations and activities in the room.
In assessing the state of the room, an easy and obvious first evaluation is to compare the presence of people, either in the room or in specific parts of t,he room, with an authorization database. This job may be made easier if the system has also provided positive identification of the persons in the room.
At. the leveI of most interest, to this project, we compare the actual pattern of activity in the room bot,h t.o a more complex aut~horization database, as well as a "learned" historical set. of "usual" activi-ties that the specific individual might undergo in the room. In this sense the system is used as an anomaly detector, as it looks for sufficient deviation from the usual activity pattern. Methods are also being constructed for characterizing the "interestingness" (or level of threat) of these activities.
The Integrated Monitoring system consists of three subsystems: data collection and fusion, analysis, and alarm/alert. An overview of the complete system is shown in Figure 1 . This system is currently being tested in a realistic setting. The many vagaries of a room including cluttering equipment (which is frequently moved about), tracking more than one person, and human movements which are difficult to predict beforehand are providing an excellent training testbed for our system.
Data Collection and Fusion
The data collection subsystem consists of the various sensors and their communications with the central database. The primary parts of this subsystem are sensors that can track and identify personnel, and sensors that can track (or detect) radioactive sources. The fusion of information from a variety of sensors is a key feature of this subsystem.
Personnel tracking is done by a range of sensors, potentially including video camera, motion detection arrays, active radio-location systems, and active badge systems. Personnel recognition/verification involves a variety of biometric methods: face recognition, fingerprint identification, gait, voice, and/or iris recognition. It is our belief that having a variety of such systems will make the job of spoofing the system much harder. In addition, the use of active badges allows the system to do the much easier task of verifying an identity (rather than recognition).
Radioactive source tracking/monitoring is being performed by radiation sensor arrays, bar codes, and source characterization sensors. Part of the lowerlevel reasoning that takes place at the fusion level of this module involves attaching an identified person object to the source object, and tracking their combined movement around the room
Video Tracking
Video cameras form one of the primary sensor systems of the AMISS project, due to the large amount of information that can be gained from them [ 5 ] . Cameras with wide fields of view can be used to survey large portions of the room simultaneously, allowing objects to be tracked as they move through the room.
Overlapping fields of view gives us the ability to perform fusion at the video identification level. The capability to zoom in on people objects once t,hey are segmented out allows for face recognition. With sufficient processing, some activity classification is possible (e.g., Fred is kneeling in front of the vault).
The main thrust in the AMISS video processing to date has been in the isolation of people objects from the background, and in tracking them. The cameras provide one of the few reliable ways t o obtain object position information. The goal of tracking is to determine the positions of all the objects moving in the room, in real-time, and t o provide temporally consistent labeling, so that "Fred" remains recognized as "Fred" while he moves around the room. The problem is complicated by having a number of non-human objects in the room, many of which are large enough to occlude a person as he/she walks behind them, and some of which can be (and often are) moved around.
Our approach is t o first build single camera tracking systems, optimizing their performance on large areas of the room, and then t o fuse together the results from several camera systems in order to obtain more reliable labeling and position information.
The advantages of fusing several systems together are readily apparent. What is partially occluded by a file cabinet in one camera's view rnight be fully visible in the view of another camera. The apparent resolution due to perspective differences may be greater in one view than another, allowing more precise position estimation using more than one view. A person's face might be turned towards one camera, allowing face recognition, while only the back of the head may be seen in the other.
Using this approach, we are able to track multiple objects as they move around the room, obtaining fairly reliable labeling results in the face of occlusions and overlapping objects, and t o accurately estimate the three-dimensional real world positions of those objects.
Other Sensor Systems
In addition to video, we use an array of PIR sensors to localize motion in the room. Individually. these PIR sensors give relatively low-level information on possible locations of moving person-sized objects. Taken as an array, in which the PIRs are installed throughout the room with a high degree of overlap in their fields of view, the PIR sensors can give fairly reliable readings localizing the sections of the room in which there is movement. These readings are used to confirm the position estimates given by the video system, and can also be used to focus the attention of SUITE OF SENSORS the assessment system. For example, if movement is reported in a section of the room for which we have no other readings of identified objects, cameras can be focused on that area for further scrutiny, or t,he health of the other monitoring systems may be called into question for further checking.
Performing personnel identification, that is, attaching a name t o the identified person-sized blob object, is done using a variety of off-the-shelf systems, including both active and passive badge readers, face recognition systems, and voice identification systems. These systems give independent readings as they are used, and the information is fused together and attached t o the appropriate person object with an associated reading of reliability or certainty. The reliability reading is derived from fusing the individual reliabilities of the independent systems.
Tracking of radioactive sources is of interest in many of the types of facilities that we are targeting with this research. In our testbed system, we use an array of slab detectors which are used t o triangulate the source in the room. Movement. of t,he source in the room is tracked using position locations over time.
The inclusion of sensor subsystems in the AMISS system is by no means a static or completed process. As new sensor systems become available, or as we assess the need for better, different, or additional information, sensor systems can be added t o t,he current, sensor suite. The AMISS system design is modular, and is not cued t o a particular sensor identifying and tracking a person or a radioactive source. Rather, these sensor system components can be switched in and out of the larger assessment system as needed. The underlying framework of taking in information from a variety of sensor sources, fusing it and reasoning about it, is independent of any particular sensor.
Communication
In order t o enhance the ability of the various sen&or subsystems and to perform the lusion and reasoning, information must be readily passed between all sensor collection systems. In some situations, initial assessment of the safety and security of the facility can be made with an authorization databasc. In order t o make this assessment, the sensor systems must be reporting t o a central location in the facility management system.
If available for the facility and tests being performed, the authorization database can provide information on expected activities, e g how many people are expected t o enter the nuclear material area, what the expected activity is, where the people will be, what nuclear material is t o be handled, etc.
The AMISS data communications system is designed to ensure that all the needed information is stored in a central database, and to allow any particular sensor system t o access any other information that it might need. Thus information can be passed across the system, as well as upward to the central database.
T h e database also serves as a repository for archived sensor data. These archives are called upon during some parts of the threat assessment process, when further information is needed by the reasoning syst,em. For example, a falling level of reliability of personnel identification may trigger the need t o have a guard look again at the last 10 seconds of video at the door entry-way, or t o query the last 20 seconds of active badge readings from a particular location in the room.
T h e data collection design makes possible the m iplementation of the virtual sensor concept, which vastly simplifies sensor fusion.
Primitive and Virtual Sensors
One of the strengths of the AMISS project, is that it is designed t o allow the painless inclusion of virtual sensors into the system. Also called smart sensors, these systems are relatively independent of the physical sensor hardware, and rather emerge as a combination or post-processed version of potentially several sensor syst.ems.
Many of the commercially-available sensors that, we are using send out raw information that can be used for more than one purpose. For example, with radiation sensors it is possible t o locate a radiation source in the room by processing the information one way, but. it. is also possible t o identify various radioactive sources and dist,inguish t,hem frorn one another, using different processing. The raw data from the "primit,ive" radiation sensors may well end up in the database, but one or more virtual sensors, providing information gained from processing that same raw data, will also appear giving readings in parallel with the primitive sensors.
Again, this concept lends itself t o making data fusion much more modular than it would be otherwise, since a virtual sensor can take in any variety of raw data by asking for it. Virtual sensors also allow the easy inclusion of complex processing building blocks into the system, while making it seem as if the data is coming from just another sensor.
Analysis

Authorization Checking
The first line of defense against, illegal or mistaken activity is to check ongoing act,ivities against an authorization database, if one exists. Security personnel can enter information on the identities of individuals allowed to ent.er the secure area, the time they are allowed to enter, and the sources they are allowed t o access. Then, as activities occur, such as t,he ent,rance of a new individual or the removal of a source, the activity can be checked against the authorized act>ivities in the database.
Further security can be added by learning individuals' normal behaviors. This line of defense would be most appropriate for detecting when aut,horized individuals are behaving in a manner inconsistent, with their usual behavior, perhaps indicat.ing an insider threat. For example, this system might be expected to note that a specific individual had never handled a specific source before, as well as detecting that a specific source had been moved into a location in which it, had never been before.
Reasoning
In the AMISS system, we learn pat,terns of behavior by clust.ering the patderns using an adapt,ive neural network [4] . The neural network is trained to learn the sequences of actions an individual makes as they move about the room, using sensor data stored in t,he database capturing t,he individual's normal behavior [l] . The sequence of actions being learned may also include information on t,he state of the room while the activity was occurring, for example, merging data on the location of the person with indications of the number of sources in the room, the number of other people in the room, and which doors are open.
After training on available data, tshe net.work can identify whet8her t,he current, ongoing act,ivit-y mat,ches the system's learned pattern of behavior for that person or not. When the neural net,work triggers a false alarm, wrongly identifying an activity as abnormal, the network can add that pattern to its t,raining set, and quickly learn that. the misidentified behavior is normal.
The analysis subsyst,em uses bot,h rule-based expert systems and adaptive technologies. Some rules for assessing the safety and securit,y of a facility are known, and can be used direct,ly in a rule-based syst,em. Much of the expert, knowledge on facilit,ies monitoring, especially when it, involves normal day-to-day human behaviors, is not, immediately amenable t,o rule-based processing. Our plans are to implement knowledge extraction methods which discover rules from data over time, and t o enhance the existing rulebases with that knowledge.
In areas where standard threat analysis provides specification of threatening activity patterns, the system can be direct,ed t o explicitly look for and detect those patterns. However, the real strength of the system lies in its own ability t o learn those patterns over t,ime, to detect in real time activity patterns that it has not seen before, and t o bring these to the attention of the security analyst.
Materials Accounting and Source Tracking
Our plans are to implement additional security measures by using material accounting at the analysis level. This established process helps ensure that all nuclear matmerial is in aluthorized locations. Analysis of longer term act,ivities and sensor readings will help guard against more subtle threats such as repeated removals of small amounts of nuclear material.
Data Mining
Beyond the immediake assessment of behavior patterns developing in real time, our system plan includes a component for scrutinizing longer term patterns. We are interested in the ability of the system to capit,alize on its rich repository of information in the central database, perhaps in detecting subtle changes in the facility operating patterns over time. Interactions between individuals, auithorization patterns, and materials movement could also be gleaned from the data, even though not. readily observable in real time.
Operational data mining will be used to find and cat,egorize interesting patterns in the activity data. These patterns will t,hen be presented t,o security analysts for furt,her interpretation. Discovery of association rules [2] in t.he da.ta relating personnel, sources, and the statme of the room and its sensors is a later goal of this part of the project.
Al,arm/Alert
The potential end users of our system include the facilit,ies managers, guards, and security analysts. The int,erfaces for different, users will provide informat4ion that, is appropriat,e t.0 their use of the system, but, all will cont,ain a basic component of the alarm/alert, suhsyst,ei-ri which operat,es in real ttime.
The alarm/alert, subsystem provides for t,he int,erruption of unaut,horizetl activit,ies within the nuclear facility. It may be used t o enforce security directly, for example, by not opening a vault door for an unauthorized access attempt. At another level, it may be implemented t o go t o t h e extreme of calling automatically for actions by an armed force when the threat level is high enough. In most cases, t h e system will be providing real-time information t o t,he security forces, with video images and annotations about, detected activities. The intention of t,his type of use of the system is t o provide automated assessment of the current state of the facility, including t h e people within it, and to provide the information on which that assessment was based.
One of our design criteria is t h a t t h e system must degrade gracefully, as opposed to a system which would crash when overloaded with conflicting information. This means our system must recognize when the situation has become so complex (or ambiguous) that the system can no longer assess the appropriateness of the ongoing activity. At this "failure" point it, must inform the security forces of both its failure and its best assessment of the situation.
In many cases, we expect t h a t our system will be used t o augment t h e observational power of t h e human guards/analysts, providing additional information for them t o use in their assessment, and backup sensor data for t h a t assessment. Our system may be used t o focus attention on a particular section of the room during periods of assessed heightened threat potential. In this case, simply highlighting a portion of the video image t o call t h e guard's attention t o it would be sufficient. Information on sensor health (e.g., suspicion t h a t a camera's lens has been obstructed) could also lead t,o alert or alarm conditions within the facility, again, highlighted for further human attention.
. Discussion
This brief overview of t h e AMISS system is intended t o show the relationships of t h e overall concepts of sensor fusion, analysis, and reasoning in our security system and how t h e various subsystems interact. One focus of this project is t o bring t o bear a variety of reasoning techniques, whether rule based, statistical, fuzzy, or neural network based, on t,his problem. The wide variety in the types of sensor d a t a we can expect to reason with in a realist.ic facility . with normal human activities forces us to consider a range of computational intelligence techniques. Melding them into a single coherent system which sounds appropriate alarms for a facility under real-time operating conditions is an ongoing challenge which we are meeting with the AMISS system.
